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State Legislature which would statutorily reverse the instant case. The proposed
amendment to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law would make it a misdemeanor
to serve liquor to persons under the age of eighteen, without having first obtained
the consent of the child's parents.22 If this proposed statute is passed in its
present form, it would clearly settle the question raised in the instant case.
An absolute prohibition against serving liquor to children in one's home is
unrealistic in light of today's social mores.23 Furthermore, it conflicts with the
desirability of acquainting children with the effects of intoxicating beverages.
24
A balance should be struck between the two competing policies involved here.
Liquor control laws should allow for an opportunity for children to become
acquainted with alcohol, while preventing abuses and excesses which could lead
to a child's endangering his own life or safety, or that of others. Section 260.20
of the Revised Penal Law seeks to accomplish this by exempting parents and
guardians from the scope of the statute. The proposed amendment to the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law now before the legislature would accomplish the
same result by requiring the parent's prior consent.
GEORGE WALLACH
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-NEw YORK CODE or CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SECTION 813-c ALLows AccusED To CHALLENGE PERJURIOUS STATEMENTS IN
AN AFFIDAVIT UPON WICH A SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED To CONTROVERT
THE WARRANT
During the course of an arrest for policy gambling, evidence had been
seized pursuant to a search warrant issued on the affidavit of a policeman.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that the warrant was
defective because the statements in the affidavit on which the issuance of the
warrant rested were untrue. The New York City criminal court granted defen-
dant a hearing on his motion to controvert the search warrant and suppress the
evidence seized. At the hearing the magistrate weighed the evidence presented
by the affiant in his affidavit against evidence presented by the defendant and
two others who testified on the defendant's behalf that the statements in the
affidavit were untrue. Following the hearing the magistrate granted the defen-
dant's motion to suppress on the grounds of a "sharp conflict of testimony
creating a doubt which must be resolved for defendant."' The Appellate term
22. "An Act to Amend the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law," A. Int. 2702, Print 2760
(Feb. 1, 1966).
23. 599 of underage teenagers in New York drink, although most of it takes place
in the home. 60 Newsweek 20 (Nov. 26, 1962).
24. Barclay, Straight Thinking about Drinking, N.Y. Times Mag., Dec. 17, 1961,
p. 43. Teen-age drinking is so widespread and its effects considered so important, that a
movement has begun to foster education about alcoholic beverages in the schools. Nat'l
Education Ass'n Journal 50:53, Dec. 1961.
1. People v. Alfinito, N.Y. City Court Order Docket No. 1340 (N.Y. City Ct. 1964).
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reversed and directed a new hearing because the trial court failed to find and
state the facts upon which it had relied in granting the motion to suppress.
The people and defendant both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
first held that it was not always necessary as a matter of law that a trial court
find and state the facts upon which it relied. The Court then held that section
813-c of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure is to be construed so as to
permit an inquiry as to whether the statements in the affidavit were perjured;
second, that the burden of proof is on the person attacking the warrant and that
any fair doubt arising at the hearing as to the truthfulness of the statements in
the affidavit should be resolved in favor of the warrant.2 The Court then ordered
a new hearing to determine the issues pursuant to the rules established in its
holding. People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243
(1965).
That people are to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of their
persons, houses, papers and effects unless probable cause for such an action
exists is a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States3 and of
the State of New York.4 In 1914 the Supreme Court, relying on this Constitu-
tional guaranty, decided Weeks v. United States.5 That case held that in a
federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured
through illegal search and seizure. 6 More than half a century later the Court
in Mapp v. Ohio7 while overruling its prior decision8 held that the Weeks ex-
clusionary rule was applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result of Mapp the New York legislature in
1962 passed several procedural statutes to facilitate the mandatory application
of the Weeks exclusionary rule in the New York courts.9 One such statute,
2. People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 186, 211 N.E.2d 644, 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243,
246 (1965).
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV reads that "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
4. N.Y. Const. art. 1 § 12. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. Id. at 398.
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was overruled by Mapp. Wolf refused to
apply the Weeks exclusionary rule to the states because of the states' own experience in these
fields and because of other means existing to the individual to protect his constitutional
rights. (As to the "other means" discussed by the Court in Wolf see, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 652 n.7 (1961).) In spite of Wolf many states found these "other means" ineffective (see,
e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 440, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955)) and applied the Weeks
exclusionary rule of their own free choice. For a list of states adopting the Weeks rule before
and after Wolf see, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, Appendix at 224-32 (1960).
9. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 954; McKinney's N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, pp. 3673-74
where Governor Rockefeller lists the chapter as a result of Mapp v. Ohio making the Weeks
exclusionary rule mandatory upon the New York state courts.
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section 813-c of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, ° greatly resembled
Rule 41(e) (4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" and was to be
the basis of the holding in the instant case.
Prior to Mapp the New York courts had allowed the fruits of an illegal
search and seizure to be placed in evidence in state criminal proceedings.12 That
a search based on a search warrant requires probable cause and that the lack
of such probable cause would make the warrant itself void, the search illegal,
and the fruits of the search inadmissable as evidence in a state court is a result
of the application of the Weeks exclusionary rule to the states by Mapp. Where
the search and seizure is pursuant to a warrant based on an affidavit, the courts
have allowed an aggrieved party to challenge the sworn statements in the
affidavit as insufficient on their face to establish the required probable cause
for the issuance of such a warrant.13 But where an affidavit sufficient on its face
to establish the required probable cause is challenged as untruthful, the
decisions as to the validity of such a challenge are split. Some jurisdictions,
reasoning that the probable cause required by the federal constitution14 is that
which, is established when an affiant goes before the magistrate to procure the
warrant, have denied defendant the right to later challenge the truthfulness of
the statements in the affidavit to negate the existence of the required probable
cause.15 Other jurisdictions, including the majority of the federal courts, have
reasoned that the statements in an affidavit giving rise to the required probable
cause are factual in substance and must be capable of withstanding an attack
on their credibility at a date subsequent to the issuance of the warrant.'0 How-
10. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-c reads, "A person claiming to be aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure .. .may move for the return of such property or for the
suppression of its use as evidence. The court shall hear evidence upon any issue of fact
necessary to determination of the motion."
11. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 41(e) reads, "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure may move the district court . . . for the return of the property and to suppress
for the use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that ... (4) there was not
probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was
issued, ...."
12. People v. Variano, S N.Y.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959).
13. See, e.g., People v. Alvis, 342 Il. 460, 174 N.E. 527 (1930) ; Tischler v. State, 206
Md. 386, 111 A.2d 655 (1955); Gross v. State, 198 Md. 350, 84 A.2d 57 (1951).
14. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
15. See Kenny v. United States, 157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United States v.
Gianaris, 25 F.R.D. 194 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Tenn.
1956); United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931); Armstrong v. State, 195
Miss. 300, 15 So. 2d 438 (1943); Jackson v. State, 365 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
Typical of this line of cases is United States v. Brunett which states at 225 that "The
'probable cause' required by the Fourth Amendment is that shown by an affidavit. The
commissioner is not required to conduct an investigation for determining whether the
affidavit is true, and a subsequent showing of its falsity cannot have the effect of retro-
spectively invalidating a warrant valid when issued."
16. See, e.g., King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960); Dixon v. United
States, 211 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952 (N.D.N.Y.
1929); Williams v. Justice Ct., Oroville Judicial Dist., Butte Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 724, 40
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1963). Typical of these is King v. United States which states at p. 400
footnote 4 that "Although the majority, perhaps, of state cases have held that the aggrieved
person cannot challenge the truthfulness of the facts alleged by the affiant .. . , the rule
in the federal courts is otherwise, and false facts given by the affiant will vitiate the warrant
and search."
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ever, even those jurisdictions allowing such an attack limit this right to cases
where defendant's own statement that the affidavit is untrue is collaborated by
other witnesses. 17 The United States Supreme Court, while never deciding directly
whether authority for such an attack exists, seems to "assume" the presence of
such authority.'8 This coupled with the trend in Mapp to expand the scope of
fourth amendment rights to include protection from illegally seized evidence in
state criminal proceedings would seem to provide the state courts with the
impetus to allow a challenge against the truthfulness of an affidavit upon which
the issuance of a warrant rests.
Prior to the instant case there was no binding authority in New York
state for allowing such a challenge although several cases suggest that such
authority exists. In one case the New York Court seemed to presume an attack
on the truthfulness of an affidavit would be valid where it was obvious that the
affiant wilfully failed to properly describe the premises to be searched. 19 Another
case20 relying on Sections 807 and 80921 of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure allowed a pawnbroker to challenge the veracity of statements which
had established probable cause for the search of his shop and the seizure of
allegedly stolen property which he held as security for a loan. Section 80722
provides that the magistrate must take testimony in regard to the grounds for
the issuance of a warrant when the grounds for such an issuance are con-
troverted. Although this section was in effect before Mapp, and therefore ap-
plied principally to the return of property rather than the exclusion of evidence,
there is a case holding section 807 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as "being
within the ambit of Section 813-c," the section involved in the instant case.23
Thus one may argue (1) that section 807 allows an attack on the truthfulness
of statements, which gave rise to the required probable cause for a search and
seizure, in order to facilitate the return of illegally seized property; (2) that
section 807 is to be read in conjunction with section 813-c of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure; and that therefore (3)- section 813-c should allow
an attack on the credibility of statements in an affidavit to facilitate the ex-
clusion of evidence gained from a search pursuant to a warrant where the
statements can be shown to be false. Another argument upon which the New
York Court could have relied is that: (1) Those states having statutes similar
17. See e.g., United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952 (N.D.N.Y. 1929) where the court
held at 954: "The mere sworn denial by the defendant ...would not necessarily destroy
probable cause, . . !'
18. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964).
19. People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35, 197 N.E.2d 527, 248 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1964).
20. People ex rel. Simpson Co. v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 23, 101 N.E. 794, 796 (1913).
21. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 809 states that "If it appear that the property taken is
not the same as that prescribed in the warrant, or that there is no probable cause for
believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, the judge, justice
or magistrate must cause it to be restored to the person from whom it was taken, . . ."
22. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 807 states that "If the grounds on which the warrant
was issued be controverted, the judge, justice or magistrate must take testimony in relation
thereto."
23. People v. Brown, 40 MAsc. 2d 35, 37, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
1963).
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to the federal rule2 4 allow an attack on the affidavit; 25 (2) New York has a
statute26 which is similar27 to the federal rule; 21 therefore (3) New York should
allow an attack on the truthfulness of statements in an affidavit.
When faced with the issue in the instant case the Court failed to recognize
either the argument based on an analogy between section 813-C and section 807
or a comparison of section 813-c to the federal statute. Finding no controlling
authority on the question New York state2 9 and that the statute itself (i.e.,
section 813-c30 ) was too general to answer such a specific issue the Court turned
to foreign jurisdictions. These jurisdictions conflicted on the question of whether
a challenge of the truthfulness of statements in an affidavit should be allowed. 9 '
Finding no concrete authority the Court based its opinion on the "modern
thought which produced the decision in Mapp v. Ohio."32 In so doing the
Court faced the problem of balancing the right of the individual to be free
from unfair warrants (i.e., those based on false statements of an affiant) and
the right of the state to be free from time consuming challenges to fair warrants.
Facing this possible conflict of interest the Court allowed a challenge of the
truthfulness of statements in an affidavit thus preserving the constitutional
rights33 of the individual. The Court, however, limited the authority for such
a challenge in its holding to perjurious statements8 4 in the affidavit where the
challenging party met the burden of proof that probable cause was lacking for
the issuance of the warrant.3 5 In defining the burden which one must meet to
controvert the warrant the Court held that the accused must show that there
was no reasonable doubt that the statements in question were false in order to
be successful in his attack.36
That the Court's holding in the instant case is a necessary step in the pro-
24. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 41(e).
25. See 79 C.J.S., Search and Seizure § 86 (1952 Cumin. Supp. 1965) and cases cited
therein; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 394, 396 (1949, Supp. 1965).
26. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-c.
27. See People v. Brown, 40 Misc. 2d 35, 37, 242 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct. 1963) which states that "If the New York practice is to be at least as efficacious as the
Federal practice, . .. " Such language could well mean that New York wished to effectuate
a statute which was similar in form and substance to its federal counterpart.
28. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 41(e).
29. Instant case at 185, 211 N.E.2d at 645, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (1965).
30. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-c.
31. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964); King v. United States, 282
F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952 (N.D.N.Y. 1929) were all
cases which suggest or hold that authority for an attack on the truthfulness of statements
in an affidavit upon which a warrant was issued exists. Holding no authority exists are:
Kenny v. United States, 157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d
219 (W.D. Mo. 1931); Armstrong v. State, 195 Miss. 300, 15 So. 2d 438 (1943); Johnson
v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 101, 289 S.W.2d 249 (Crim. App. 1956).
32. Instant case at 185, 211 N.E.2d at 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (1965).
33. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.Y. Const. art. 1 § 12.
34. Instant case at 186, 211 N.E.2d at 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (1965). "We hold
as follows: first, that section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be construed so
as to permit an inquiry as to whether the affidavit's statements were perjurious, . ..'
35. United States v. Napela, 28 F.2d 898 (N.D.N.Y. 1928); United States v. Goodwin,
1 F.2d 36 (S.D. Cal. 1924).
36. Instant case at 186, 211 N.E.2d at 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (1965).
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tection of an individual's fundamental rights seems clear. To hold otherwise
would mean that the constitutional right 37 to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure could be obliterated any time a policeman was prepared to perjure
himself3 8 The fact that the accused can seek retribution by initiating an action
for perjury 39 is of little consolation to a person convicted of a criminal charge
on the basis of illegally seized evidence. As a result of the Court's holding the
possibility of continuous harassment by municipal authorities to discourage
so-called undesirables from residing within their communities, through fraudu-
lently procured search warrants, is eliminated.
However, the Court by interpreting section 813-c of the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure in the narrow context of the instant case specifically
held that only perjurious statements were open to an attack by an aggrieved
party. Perjury as defined by the New York Penal Law Section 1620 requires
a wilful assertion of fact, opinion, belief or knowledge made by a witness who
knew the same to be false. Thus the Court left undecided the rights of an
accused to challenge the validity of statements in an affidavit where an un-
intelligent or overzealous police officer makes a good faith mistake. By so doing
the Court has failed to give its holding the value that it may have. That the
Court, relying on the "modern thought which produced the decision on Mapp
v. Ohio,"40 would if faced with the question expand its present holding to
allow a challenge to statements in an affidavit which rest on a good faith
mistake of the affiant seems clear. But until such an expansion is effectuated
it is possible that a lower court relying on this case might deny an accused
the right to attack statements in an affidavit unless it could be shown that the
statements were perjurious. In distinguishing between an outright lie and a good
faith mistake by the affiant the Court has forced the challenging party to
shoulder a double burden of persuasion. First the accused would have to satisfy
the magistrate that the affiant's statements were false. Then if the accused were
successful in meeting the first burden he would further have to show that the
statements were perjurious as distinguished from a mere mistake on the part
of the affiant. To eliminate the inequities arising from such a double burden
of proof the New York courts would be wise to follow those jurisdictions which
have allowd the accused to challenge statements in an affidavit without dis-
tinguishing between whether the challenged statements were a lie or a mistake.
41
37. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.Y. Const. art. I § 12.
38. People v. Angrisani, Magis. Ct., City of N.Y., Bronx County, Docket No. 707,708
(1962). In this case the same affiant as in the instant case presented an affidavit to the
magistrate which on its face reflected the required probable cause. At a hearing the affiant
had emphatically and unequivocally identified one Marconi as the person he had observed
carrying on a number of incriminating activities. The observations were proven false since
Marconi had been incarcerated in a Federal prison during the period of the alleged ob-
servations.
39. People v. Politano, 17 A.D.2d 503, 507, 235 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (3rd Dep't 1962),
aff'd 13 N.Y.2d 852, 192 N.E.2d 271, 242 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1963).
40. Instant case at 186, 211 N.E.2d at 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (1965).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952, 954 (N.D.N.Y. 1929) where the court
said that, "if the defendant presents proof that the premises were closed ... , or any other
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A second limiting factor of the Court's decision in the instant case is the
risk of nonpersuasion which has been placed on the challenging party. That
the case clearly establishes the correct allocation of burdens between the accused
and the state seems clear.42 However, by requiring the challenging party to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements are false,43 the Court has
erected a substantial barrier for an accused. With such a burden an accused
who proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged statements
were false would be unsuccessful in his attack. To hold as the Court did that
this burden is justified because the challenged statements have previously been
examined by a "judicial officer in issuing a warrant '44 at an ex parte hearing
denies an accused his right to cross-examination which is the basis of our ad-
versary system. It may be that by construing section 813-c of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure to allow for an attack on perjurious statements
only, the Court felt a heavy burden of persuasion was necessary to protect
the affiant.45 For if the accused were to show the affiant's statements were
perjurious the affiant might be open to a felony charge40 based on such a show-
ing. By eliminating the distinction between perjurious and mistaken statements
in an affidavit the justification for placing such a heavy burden on the accused
would fall. The Court then could require a standard such as that necessary for
the magistrate to find probable cause in the first instance.47 Thus the accused
would be allowed to challenge the truthfulness of statements in an affidavit
where he presented proof sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to
believe the statements were untrue. Such a standard would facilitate the task
of distinguishing between a fair warrant and an unfair warrant while promoting
the interest of both the individual citizen and the community.
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testimony which satisfies the commissioner that the prohibition agent was mistaken, or made
a false affidavit, it would be the duty of the commissioner to vacate the search warrant."
42. People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 91, 204 N.E.2d 188, 192, 255 N.Y.S.2d 850,
856, n.2 (1965) states that "the People, in order to prevail, are under the necessity of going
forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause exist . . . in obtain-
ing a search warrant . . . ." This language, while clearly placing the burden of production
on the state, left open the question as to the burden of persuasion where an accused
challenges statements in an affidavit. This question has apparently been settled by the
instant case.
43. Instant case at 186, 211 N.E.2d at 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
44. Ibid.
45. See People v. Valasto, 258 App. Div. 896, 16 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1939);
Goldman v. Commonwealth, 100 Va. 865, 42 SE. 923 (1902). Both held that a similar
burden of persuasion rests on the state when it wishes to show criminal fraud (i.e., the
evidence must be so convincing as to exclude every reasonable doubt of guilt of the
accused).
46. See People v. Clemente, 136 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Stating that where
perjury goes to a "material matter," it is of the first degree and a felony.
47. See People v. Massey, 38 Misc. 2d 403, 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (Sup. Ct.
1963) stating that in order for the magistrate to find probable cause, the facts and circum-
stances before him must be "sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed."
